

service announcements, seminars, conferences, and other public education activities, they are working successfully to increase public respect and understanding of our wildlife resources.

A project recently announced by the Center is particularly exciting. With the support of Plum Creek Timber Co., the Center for Wildlife Information and Columbia Falls Junior High, located close to the western gateway of Glacier National Park, are working to develop a bear-awareness and wildlife stewardship education program. Under the direction of Columbia Falls Junior High's principal Neal Wedum, students and teachers will write and design educational materials and teaching units on black bear and grizzly bear identification, techniques for safe hiking and camping in bear country, and techniques for viewing and photographing wildlife safely and responsibly. Students will also develop an educational unit about partnerships between corporations, communities, and wildlife management agencies in Montana's Seeley-Swan Grizzly Bear Corridor.

In closing, Mr. President, I commend everyone involved in this remarkable effort: Chuck Bartlebaugh, Kris Backes of Plum Creek, and Principal Wedum, to name just a few. Congratulations and good work.

THE BUDGET

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, the topic of the day, the topic of the week, the topic of the month, is clearly the budget, the fiscal crisis this country has been in for a lot longer period than we care to remember. There has been discussion on this this morning. Obviously, the decision now is in the President's hands.

Republicans have clearly defined what they attempt to do. It is anything but an extreme measure. The President, if he will simply follow his own admonitions to us, will find it very difficult to disagree and veto the Republican plan that is being sent to him.

The President called for a 7-year budget with real numbers. We gave him a 7-year budget with real numbers. We are asking him for a commitment to that; frankly, a commitment to simply negotiate how that is achieved in return for a resolution which would provide funding for the Government so Government workers can come back to work on Monday.

BOSNIA

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I would like to divert from that just for a moment because, were it not for the overshadowing presence of the budget debate, which is appropriate, I suspect we may be on this floor debating an issue that is of great significance and great importance.

As we speak, the United States is leading an effort in Dayton, OH, to attempt to reach some kind of peace agreement between the warring fac-

tions in Bosnia. That has been an elusive goal, one which different parties and different factions have been attempting over nearly a 600-year period of time; in this latest conflict, 4 years of serious engagement with disastrous and tragic consequences for hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions of people, in that part of the world.

But, if we have learned anything, I think, from our recent history in terms of the United States involvement in conflicts abroad, it is that any kind of involvement, and particularly a long-term involvement, anything exceeding just a matter of days, ultimately cannot succeed without the support of the American people.

That support is expressed through their elected representatives. The President has said and Congress has said that it is appropriate for Congress to examine the conditions upon which any U.S. troops will be subject to deployment to a foreign land, particularly one in which potential conflict and potential threat to their health and safety and life exist.

At this point, hopefully, we are nearing a real peace agreement in Dayton. I have some very deep concerns about the nature of that agreement and whether it can even be accurately described as a peace agreement. But, unfortunately, the President of the United States for whatever reason some time ago, and on numerous occasions, has made commitments to deploy troops as soon as this agreement is reached.

There have been some recent indications that the President is willing to let Congress take a look at, examine, and analyze the peace agreement but no commitment that, even if we disagree, the troops will not be sent. In fact, there is pretty good indication that an advance party of up to 2,000 American troops will be sent there to sort of hold the line while the so-called 2-week "period of examination" passes. The President hopes for congressional support and authorization. He has not yet received it, nor will he unless he is able to go before the American people and go before this Congress and make a compelling case for use of United States troops on the ground in Bosnia. That case, I suggest, has not been made, and has not even been attempted to be presented to the American people a cogent, logical, understandable reason why 20,000 uniformed troops of the United States Armed Forces need to be inserted into the conflict in Bosnia. The President may intend to do that. I do not know. He has waited a dangerously long time.

The argument that the administration has made, feeble as it is, is that it is necessary for two reasons: One, to contain the spread of the conflict to other areas which involve other NATO allies which eventually will pull in all of Europe. There is little reason to suspect that will happen. It has not in a 4-year period of time.

What we have essentially looked at is a civil war within a confined border of three factions fighting for land which they have fought for for nearly 600 years—avenging tragedies, avenging killings, avenging land seizures and private property seizures which have taken place over a significant period of time. Even if spreading beyond the current borders were a real possibility, there are strategies, containment strategies, that NATO could employ which are far different and involve far less risk than inserting 20,000 American troops and 40,000 NATO troops for a total of 60,000 onto the ground in the middle of the conflict that currently exists in Bosnia.

The second reason the administration postulates is that our involvement with troops on the ground is necessary to maintain the integrity of NATO. I think that even that is a questionable proposition.

In a recent article in Time magazine by Charles Krauthammer he talks about that very point, saying, "Of course, the single most powerful argument in favor of deployment invokes NATO: to renege on this promise of American relief for our NATO allies already trapped in Bosnia in a fruitless 'peacekeeping' mission." He asserts that it "would be the worst blow Clinton has yet dealt"—I am quoting—"to NATO cohesion."

"Whatever the strategic policy of having our troops in Bosnia, the argument goes, our NATO allies want us to take the lead on the ground, and we promised that we would do that."

But, as Krauthammer goes on to explain, our recent history indicates that one of two things are going to probably happen. Either we will suffer a loss of life—either we will suffer a situation which is far different than what could be described as peace, and, therefore, without having gotten the commitment of the Congress, or the commitment of the American people, we will call for a withdrawal of those troops which would be a serious blow to the integrity of NATO—or it may result in a long-term deployment and commitment of those troops which we have not again made the case for, nor do I think we can begin to expect American support for, a long-term commitment to that.

Either one of those occurrences, one of which is likely to happen, could do great damage to the NATO alliance and, as Krauthammer argues, and I agree, actually do more damage than not providing troops on the ground.

The President has not defined our vital interests in that involvement. He has not defined what our objective and mission would be. He has not defined how we would exit from the situation other than to say we will be out of there within a year. I think what he means by that is that we will be out of there before the next election. It is politically not feasible, and untenable to think the troops would still be there and become an election issue. That in

and of itself is a recipe for disaster given the nature of the warfare. And anybody who understands the enmity that exists between the parties, and the conflict over who owns what land, knows that the American troops being out longer than a year is likely to just promote and produce a situation in which the parties wait out the situation, and then would return to the status quo, which is obviously not something that any of us looks forward to.

There are a couple of other concerns that I have. One is the question of neutrality. It is one thing to send troops into a situation when those troops are viewed—and that nation sending the troops is viewed—as a truly neutral partner in the process. In this case, we have decidedly sided with one faction in this conflict—the Bosnian Moslems. While we have not seen the final details of the peace agreement, the United States has indicated that one of our objectives in this deployment will be to arm the Moslems, will be to bring them to “a level of parity” with the other factions. That may be comforting news to the Bosnian Moslems. I doubt that is very comforting to the other parties in the conflict, and certainly not the Serbs.

So what our goal should be is a disarming of all parties involved, to reduce the level of tension and reduce the level of potential conflict rather than build up the capacity of one of the parties but, in doing so, even if that were an agreed upon military strategy, I think that is a terrible political strategy because we will not be viewed as a neutral party. The United States, which is already by the very nature of its—I ask unanimous consent for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. The United States which is already viewed by a number of countries as not necessarily a neutral entity, and which has become a target, unfortunately, over the years for terrorists and extremists and others that want to disrupt either the peace talks or simply make a point, I think would clearly be identified as a party which was not neutral in this conflict and clearly would be a potential target for terrorism.

I had the experience nearly a decade ago of traveling to Beirut visiting the marines that were encamped between warring factions, and witnessed the aftereffects of the tragic bombing of the marine barracks that cost the loss of several hundred lives. Those that perpetrated this incident wanted to make a point, and by making that point they felt that they could influence the course of that conflict. And they did. I think the very same something—maybe not the very same but something similar—happened in Somalia.

So we at great risk put our troops between the warring factions.

My final point is that I think we need to be very, very careful about what a

peace agreement says and means that might come out of Dayton. Dayton could very well produce a “peace”—I put that word in quotation marks. Again, I am referring to the Krauthammer piece—a “peace” that is unstable and divisive, and largely unenforceable. It may be a peace imposed rather than a peace sought and agreed to by the warring factions; imposed by outside forces. If that is the case, we are likely to have a situation where, as Krauthammer says, this lowest common denominator peace plan commands three grudging, resentful signatures from unreconciled parties. That is a disaster for American troops on the ground. And particularly, if the President has not sought the support of the American people, the support of their elected representatives, and defined for the American people just why it is necessary to utilize American troops on the ground. We need to make sure.

I ask for one additional minute, and I promise to quit even if I am not finished.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

We should make sure that we have an ironclad commitment from the three parties involved that they not only are seeking a true peace but they are willing to self-enforce a true peace; that they will do so with a build-down of forces instead of a buildup of forces; that they will do so with wide zones of separation between them; that the peace will be essentially self-enforcing; and that they will be committed to bringing about that cessation of hostility and conflict between them.

If that is the case, one has to ask themselves the question, why are 60,000 troops needed to enforce that? If that is not the case, I think we have a very serious question.

My time has expired, and I promised to quit, and even though I have more to say, I will say it later. I thank the Chair and the patience of my colleague from Nebraska.

Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GREGG). The Senator from Nebraska.

PEACE IN BOSNIA

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, with additional time, I would love to discuss this situation with the Senator from Indiana. It is a very difficult situation. I was in the Krajina Valley a couple days after the Croatian Army had driven back the Croatian Serbs and several hundred thousand estimated, a couple hundred thousand civilians left that valley, and a day later 120 millimeter rockets came into a market in Sarajevo and killed another 40 civilians. And not long after that a President Clinton-led NATO engaged in airstrikes, and it was not long before you could fly into Sarajevo.

We see the makings of peace in the region. It is an unprecedented event with the United States leading in a dip-

lomatic effort, Ambassador Holbrooke going around the clock with unimaginable stamina to try to negotiate a settlement.

I listened to the House debate last night on this subject, and I must say I hope our own words do not make it more difficult to get an agreement and we do not find ourselves right back in the soup. I think it is a long shot to get a peace agreement. No question it is going to be difficult to get, but I think in any evaluation of what has gone on in Bosnia in the last 60 days you almost have to begin and end with praise for President Clinton's ability to lead NATO and to lead to where we are today, which is a significant reduction of violence in that part of the world.

DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, as to the Deficit Reduction Act, I would like to make a few comments.

First, we need to sort of check our own rhetoric and ask ourselves why. A lot of people come down and say we have unprecedented debt mounting on top of record debt. We do not have record debt. Our percentage of debt to GDP is going down. A lot of people say we have to do what we did in the cold war. During World War II, we accumulated almost 130 GDP of debt and won the war as a consequence, did the Marshall plan after that, rebuilt our own country as a consequence of a willingness to go into debt, no matter how we used that debt. I will get to that later.

I am very much concerned that a growing portion of our outlays is going not to investments but going to current consumption. I think it is a significant problem. It is not a problem, by the way, caused by the poor. I voted against this proposal for a number of reasons. I do not think it is fair. I do not believe it asks people like myself with higher income to participate in deficit reduction, which I think is terribly important. I receive very little in the way of Government services. People with lower incomes do receive more in Government service. I am asking them to shoulder a disproportionate share of eliminating this deficit.

Second, not only does it rend the social safety net, but it does not start us on the road to evaluating what kind of safety net do we need. I think most of us in this body now believe that we have to have economic growth, that our tax policies, which I do not think encourage savings and investment, need to be written so that we get the kind of investment and economic growth the country needs; that we have regulatory policies that are mindful of the risks that people take when they invest money.

Most of us understand that we have to have an economy that is growing, but if you are going to have a vibrant market economy where people are making business and bottom line decisions, you also have to have some kind of safety net out there. We ought to be